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Mental Examinations of Criminal
Defendants in Federal Court
PETER K. NUNEZ*
The introduction of the insanity defense by defendants in federal
criminal prosecutions has engendered numerous procedural diffi-
culties, many of which arise to constitutional proportions. Al-
though the various federal courts have almost universally arrived
at the same ultimate resolution of these problems, the paths they
have taken to reach those results have been far from identical.
Moreover, because some of these problems involve apparently ir-
reconcilable legal and constitutional principles, some of the ac-
cepted solutions contain glaring defects.
The insanity defense has proven to be a dynamic area of the law
in recent years. An analysis of the reported insanity cases in the
federal system indicates that significant developments have oc-
curred within the past decade. Most prominent among those
developments has been the almost universal rejection of the here-
tofore universally accepted M'Naghtem' standards for determining
criminal responsibility. Only one of the eleven circuit courts of
* Member, California Bar. A.B., 1964, Duke University; J.D., 1970,
University of San Diego School of Law.
1. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.
1843).
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appeals still applies the M'Naghten standards, 2 while seven others'
have rejected those standards in favor of the American Law In-
stitute's Model Penal Code formulation.4 The remaining three
circuits have substituted their own hybrid rules in place of
M'Naghten.5 All seven circuits which now apply the A.L.I. test
made the switch between 1963 and 1970. 6 The tests now in use
in the other circuits were either adopted or substantially modified
since 1961.
Whether these changes were responsible for the myriad of con-
stitutional and procedural problems which recently have been
troubling the courts, or rather, merely reflect an increased em-
phasis on the insanity defense by the Bench and Bar is impossible
to tell. A more realistic explanation is that the veritable explosion
of Supreme Court cases extending and expanding the rights of the
criminal defendant, coupled with an increased awareness on the
part of defense attorneys, is responsible for the dynamic growth
in the law. But whichever answer is correct, it is fair to say that
the focus of attention is now upon the administration of the
insanity defense rather than upon which of the several sets of
standards of responsibility should be applied.
Most of the problems with which this article deals begin when
the prosecution seeks to have its psychiatric experts examine a
defendant who has raised the insanity defense. There are several
different ways in which the district court may be asked to
grant a psychiatric examination of a defendant. Some of the
2. Amador Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1962).
3. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); United
States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968) (en banc); Blake v.
United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc); United States v.
Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States, v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680
(7th Cir. 1967) (en banc); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir.
1970) (en banc); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963)
(en banc), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964).
4. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft, 1962).
5. The Third and District of Columbia Circuits have each adopted a
substantiality test although neither is worded in terms of the Model Penal
Code. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961); Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), modified, McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc). The Eighth
Circuit has left itself free to accept any test which embraces the three ele-
ments of knowledge, will, and choice. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710
(8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
6. See note 3 supra.
problems with which a court and the parties may find themselves
faced are created by a misunderstanding as to which of these
various procedures is involved. For instance, the court has author-
ity under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 to order a psychiatric examination of a
defendant whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that he
is "presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to
be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly
to assist in his own defense . . . ." A motion for a judicial deter-
mination of present competency must be made by the United States
Attorney when he has such reasonable cause, but it may also be
made by defense counsel or the court on its own motion. When
faced with such a motion, the court must order the defendant
examined by at least one psychiatrist, who reports directly to the
court.7 If the report indicates a lack of present competence, a
hearing must be ordered at which the court makes a finding with
respect thereto.
But this 4244 examination and hearing has a narrow purpose-a
determination of competence to stand trial. It does not expressly
authorize the appointment of a psychiatrist to examine the de-
fendant for any other reason. And it should not be confused with
the authority of the court under the Criminal Justice Act8 to
approve the expenditure of funds for a psychiatrist to assist in
the defense of a case in which the defendant alleges that he was
incompetent at the time of the offense. Section 3006A (e) provides
that expert witness fees are available to a defendant who has
been declared indigent by the court. This procedure can be in-
itiated only by the defendant. Once authorized, the expert be-
comes a member of the defense team just as if the defendant
had retained his services himself.9 Neither the court nor the prose-
cution is entitled to see the reports prepared by the expert except
through normal discovery procedures.10
Neither of these situations should be confused with that posed
when the prosecution seeks a court order compelling the defendant
to submit to an examination by a prosecution expert after the
defendant has raised the issue of his criminal responsibility at
the time of the offense. No statutory authority exists which ex-
7. The failure of the court to follow this procedure may be grounds for
reversing a subsequent conviction. See United States v. Irvin, 450 F.2d
968 (9th Cir. 1971).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e)
(Supp. 1971).
9. See Comment, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964-Defendant's Right
to an Independent Psychiatric Examination, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 443(1971).
10. Fm. R. CmM. P. 16.
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pressly covers this situation." As indicated above, section 4244 is
designed to assist the court in determining competence to stand
trial, and section 3006A (e) is limited solely to providing expert wit-
nesses for strictly defense purposes. But in spite of the lack of
any statutory authority, the federal courts have unanimously con-
cluded that the prosecution is entitled to such an examination,
and further, that the defendant can be compelled to cooperate
with the prosecution expert. The many procedural issues with
which the courts have been struggling stem directly from this sit-
uation.
AUTHORITY TO ALLow PROSECUTION EXAmINATIONS
The lack of any statutory provision expressly authorizing dis-
trict courts to grant a prosecution motion for an examination of
the defendant has caused a certain degree of uneasiness among
appellate courts. In their search for such authority, the courts
have considered the following theories: 1) that it is derived in-
ferentially from section 4244; 2) that it arises as a quid pro quo for
granting a defendant a "free" expert under section 3006A(e); 3)
that it is derived from the inherent powers of the court. It is
respectfully submitted that neither of the first two theories is
sound, and that the authority, if it exists, flows only from the
inherent power of the courts.
In United States v. Albright,12 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recognized the limited purpose of section 4244. The court
stated that that section "has no literal application to a case where
a defendant pleads . . . that he was insane at the time of com-
mission of the alleged offense but sane at the time of trial, except
where the claim of previous insanity may provide reasonable
cause to believe present insanity."' 3  This reasoning has been
adopted and followed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.' 4
11. Even the provision in effect in the District of Columbia, which is
similar to the wording of section 4244, does not expressly authorize the
court to order an examination as to the defendant's mental condition at
the time of the offense. But a long line of cases from the D.C. Circuit
has indicated that the statute does authorize such action. See, e.g., United
States v. Ashe, 427 F.2d 626, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Edmonds v. United
States, 260 F.2d 474, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1958); D.C. CODE § 24-301 (a) (1961).
12. 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
13. Id. at 722.
14. United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971).
On the other hand, at least one case can be read as approving
the use of section 4244 for the purpose of providing the prosecution
with access to the defendant on the issue of criminal responsibility.
Although the underlying sequence of events was not set forth in
detail in United States v. Handy,15 it appears that the district
court appointed two psychiatrists to examine the defendant before
trial. It is not clear upon what authority the district court relied.
One of the psychiatrists subsequently testified for the defendant
and the other for the prosecution at the trial. The circuit court
was mindful that the "court-appointed psychiatrist" had testified
for the prosecution to rebut the defense of insanity, yet specifically
found that the examination ordered by the trial judge was author-
ized by statute, citing section 4244.16
The Handy case followed by a year and a half an earlier Ninth
Circuit decision which had questioned the propriety of reliance
on section 4244. In Wade v. United States,17 the district court
had appointed a psychiatrist under section 4244 for the dual pur-
pose of determining both competency to stand trial and criminal
responsibility at the time of the offense. The majority decision
of the en banc court questioned the authority of the district court
to make such an order pursuant to section 4244 or any other
authority. But due to a reversal of Wade's conviction on other
grounds, the question was not answered.' 8
An earlier case indicates the pitfalls which await reliance on
section 4244. In United States v. Driscoll,9 the district court
granted a pretrial defense motion under section 4244. The trial
judge appointed a psychiatrist who found the defendant compe-
tent to stand trial. After the defense had presented expert testi-
mony to the effect that the defendant was incompetent at the
time of the offenses, the prosecution called in rebuttal the psy-
chiatrist who had previously been appointed for the purposes of
the section 4244 determination. Relying solely upon interviews
conducted under the 4244 order, this expert testified that the de-
fendant was competent at the time of the offenses. In addition,
as the basis for his conclusion, he repeated numerous statements
the defendant had made relating to his family history and personal
habits.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the admission of this
testimony deprived him of various constitutional rights, violated
15. 450 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971).
16. Id. at 148-49.
17. 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
18. Id. at 74.
19. 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cr. 1968).
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the protective provisions of section 4244,20 and offended basic
notions of fairness. Without dealing with the first two issues,
the circuit court reversed the conviction, holding that it was unfair
to use this testimony against the defendant without giving him
notice of this possibility before the examination.2 1  The court
noted that the original order of appointment by the trial court
was clearly limited in scope to competency to stand trial. Focusing
upon the defendant's "reasonable expectations," 22 the court stated
that he was entitled to notice of the scope of the examination so
that he could consult with his counsel beforehand and be pre-
pared to fully and intelligently respond to the examiner's ques-
tions.
At least two courts have stated that the availability of expert
witnesses to indigent defendants under section 3006A(e) of the
Criminal Justice Act supports a conclusion that the prosecution
is entitled to an examination of the defendant. In Pope v. United
States, 23 the witness fees for three defense experts were paid for
under the Criminal Justice Act. Following their testimony, the
district court granted a prosecution motion to have its experts
examine the defendant. The defendant argued on appeal that the
court had no power to order such an examination. In rejecting this
argument the circuit court stated:
20. "No statement made by the accused in the course of any examina-
tion into his sanity or mental competency provided for by this section,
whether the examination shall be with or without the consent of the
accused, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the issue of
guilt in any criminal proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970). That section
also prohibits the introduction of a finding of competency to stand trial on
the issue of competency at the time of the offense.
One exception has been carved out of this prohibition. In one case, the
defendant had initially been found to be incompetent to stand trial follow-
ing proceedings under section 4244. He was later found to be compe-
tent and brought to trial. He introduced into evidence the initial finding
of incompetency. The prosecution responded by introducing the subse-
quent finding of competency. Under these circumstances the circuit court
ruled that the defendant had waived his statutory right to prohibit the
introduction of the finding of competency to stand trial. Lyles v. United
States, 254 F.2d 725, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (en banc), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
961 (1958).
21. 399 F.2d at 138. Accord, United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 711(2d Cir. 1969).
22. 399 F.2d at 137.
23. 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967) [en banc decision by Circuit Judge
(now Justice) Blackmun], vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
It would be a strange situation, indeed, if, first, the government is
to be compelled to afford the defense ample psychiatric service
and evidence at government expense and, second, if the govern-
ment is to have the burden of proof, as it does with the compe-
tency issue in the case, [citation], and yet it is to be denied the
opportunity to have its own corresponding and verifying examina-
tion, a step which perhaps is the most trustworthy means of at-
tempting to meet that burden. Yet that is precisely what the de-
fense claims is appropriate here.24
Whether it is appropriate to equate the funds used by the prose-
cution (United States Attorney's office) with those used by the de-
fense (under the Criminal Justice Act), and call them both "gov-
ernment" expenses is, in this context, open to some criticism. But
whatever the case may be, the court specifically held that the
"government" was appropriately granted leave to have the de-
fendant examined by experts of its choice and to present their
opinions in evidence.25
The underlying philosophical approach in the Pope case was
what the court characterized as a matter of "fundamental fair-
ness, 26 meaning due regard for the constitutional rights of the
defendant balanced against appropriate action in furtherance of
the search for the truth. This philosophical approach was reiter-
ated by the Fourth Circuit in the Albright case.27 Beginning with
the proposition that the maintenance of a fair state-individual
balance requires that the "government" be permitted to have its
experts examine the defendant, the court set forth the factors
which it felt supported its conclusion: 1) The prosecution has the
burden of proof; 2) If the defendant is indigent, the "government"
supplies him with expert witnesses under section 3006A(e); 3)
It would be a "strange situation" if the prosecution could not
meet its burden through the most trustworthy means available-
with a cite to Pope. The court expanded upon the second item in
a footnote:
But our decision is not predicated on defendant's indigency. If a
defendant is indigent and avails himself of government aid to
support his defense of insanity, that fact merely makes the
government's right to have him examined more critical in the
maintenance of a "fair state-individual balance," but the govern-
ment's right to the examination stems from the burden of proof
cast upon it and the desirability that the issue be determined on
the most reliable evidence available.26
Both the Pope and Albright courts exercised a certain amount
24. Id. at 720.
25. Id. at 721.
26. Id. at 720.
27. 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
28. Id. at 724 n.8.
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of wisdom in not relying too heavily upon their references to
section 3006A(e) to support their decisions. Otherwise, they would
have found themselves in a strange situation when faced with
an affluent defendant arguing the same point. But their refer-
ences to the prosecution's burden of proof and the truth-seeking
purposes of the adversary process are central to the commonly
expressed conclusion that the district, courts have the inherent
power to order the defendant to submit to a prosecution exami-
nation. The Pope decision did not include the words "inherent
power", but there is no other way that that case can be inter-
preted.29
In Albright, the defendant had disclosed his insanity defense
for the first time on the first day of trial, to the surprise of the
court and prosecution. After putting on its case-in-chief, the
prosecution unsuccessfully attempted to preclude the defendant
from presenting expert testimony. The prosecution then obtained
a court order pursuant to section 4244, which included an order
that the defendant cooperate with the expert. That expert tes-
tified for the prosecution on the issue of competency at the time of
the offense when the trial resumed after a 23-day recess. As
discussed above,30 the appellate court stated that section 4244 is
appropriate if the claim. of previous insanity provides reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant is presently insane. The circuit
court concluded that the district court decision was within reason
in concluding that the insanity defense provided some question as
to present competency, and that the invocation of section 4244 was
proper. 31  But the court went further, and stated that even if
29. Shortly after the Pope decision the Eighth Circuit again had the
opportunity to consider this issue. In Alexander v. United States, 380 F.2d
33 (8th Cir. 1967), the district court had initially granted a motion under
section 4244 to have the defendant examined as to competency to stand
trial, and then granted a prosecution motion during trial to have the de-
fendant examined as to competency at the time of the offense. On ap-
peal the defendant argued that this latter examination was unauthorized
by any rule or statute. In rejecting this argument, the circuit court in-
voked "judicial common sense" and upheld the district court order, rely-
ing primarily upon the earlier Pope decision. 380 F.2d at 39.
30. See text at note 13 supra.
31. The difficulties associated with such "dual purpose" orders are dis-
cussed in connection with the Driscoll case above. See text at notes
19-22. In Driscoll, however, the scope of the original order of appoint-
ment was clearly limited to competency to stand trial, while in Albright,
the district court apparently intended that the scope of the examination
resort to section 4244 was not proper the district court has "in-
herent power" to require the examination where the defendant
has raised the issue and intends to put on evidence in support
thereof, and "ample authority" to order the defendant to submit.8 2
Relying upon the decisions in Pope, Albright, and Alexander v.
United States,33 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
"a strong case can be made for the existence" of a power in the
district court to order the defendant to undergo an examination
by a prosecution expert.3 4 In United States v. Baird,3" the same
circuit was influenced by principles of "fundamental fairness" in
the administration of criminal justice when it held that "the
authority to permit the Government to examine the accused ...
stems from the inherent power of the courts in criminal cases."3 6
Relying primarily on the Albright case, the Seventh Circuit has
also expressly held that the federal courts have the inherent
power to order such an examination. 37 More recently the Ninth
Circuit has suggested, with some equivocation, that this inherent
power may in fact exist.38
In sum, attempts to premise the judicial authority to grant pros-
ecution motions to have the defendant examined by a prosecution
expert upon either sections 4244 or 3006A(e) have either failed
completely or have been cast under severe suspicion. The con-
sensus among the circuits is that the authority stems primarily
from the inherent power of the courts to supervise the adminis-
tration of criminal justice, with emphasis upon principles of "fun-
damental fairness" and the maintenance of a "fair state-individual
balance." References to sections 4244 and 3006A(e) serve no pur-
pose other than to generate confusion and possible reversible error,
and should be assiduously avoided by those making or granting
such motions.
SANCTIONS
Once the district court has decided to grant the prosecution the
that it authorized under section 4244 was to include both competency to
stand trial and competency at the time of the offense.
32. 388 F.2d at 723.
33. 380 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
34. United States v. Driscoll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968).
35. 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969).
36. Id. at 710.
37. United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 66 (7th Cir. 1971).
38. United States v. Handy, 450 F.2d 145, 149 (9th Cir. 1971). In an
earlier decision the Ninth Circuit had raised, without deciding, the question
as to whether the district court had the inherent power to order the de-
fendant to cooperate. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 74 (9th Cir.
1970) (en banc).
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right to examine the defendant, it must be wary of how it drafts
the order. Quite commonly the defendant opposes the prosecu-
tion's request, and the court finds itself in the position of ordering
the defendant to cooperate under sanction for failure to do so.
The sanction which the court imposes, and which it may have
to enforce, may lead to other problems.
In Wade v. United States,30 the district court had ordered the
defendant to "cooperate and provide information to the court-
appointed psychiatrist, or else be 'precluded at the time of trial
from offering any evidence upon the defense of insanity.'"40 The
circuit court was troubled by the prospect of a defendant being
precluded by the trial court from asserting an otherwise valid de-
fense, but refused to rule on the issue.41 At the same time,
however, the court hinted that a more restrictive order "simply
barring the defendant from presenting the testimony of any medi-
cal expert to whom he himself had given a personal history unless
he similarly cooperated with the expert appointed by the court" 42
might be treated differently. But the Wade decision evades analy-
sis because the psychiatrist appointed by the court was appointed
for a dual purpose under section 4244, and it is not clear whether
the proposed sanction was intended to compel cooperation for both
purposes or only for the limited purpose of determining compe-
tency to stand trial.
The Wade decision cited only one case dealing with the wording
of an order compelling a defendant to submit to a prosecution
examination. In United States v. Baird,43 the trial court ordered
the defendant "to cooperate fully with the examining psychiatrist
and to answer each and every question put to him by the psy-
chiatrist."44 On appeal, the defendant relied upon two state cases
in attacking that order. In French v. District Court,4 5 the trial
court had ordered the defendant to undergo a pretrial examination
following his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. When the
39. 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
40. Id. at 74.
41. The appellant's conviction had been overturned by the court's de-
cision to adopt the A.L.I. test of criminal responsibility in place of the
"antiquated" common law M'Naghten rule. 426 F.2d at 73.
42. Id. at 74.
43. 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969).
44. Id. at 705.
45. 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963).
defendant refused to cooperate the trial court ordered that the
plea be withdrawn unless the defendant relented. The Colorado
Supreme Court reversed the subsequent conviction, holding that
the order compelling the defendant to cooperate in order to retain
his insanity defense violated the fifth amendment. 0 The Baird
court distinguished the French case, noting that the sanction
threatened to strike the insanity defense entirely, whereas no such
drastic sanction was even suggested by the trial court in Baird.
The other case relied upon by Baird was State v. Olson.47 There,
the prosecution was seeking to have its expert examine the de-
fendant even though he had not interposed an insanity defense.
The sanction imposed for a failure to cooperate was a forfeiture of
the insanity defense. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that
such an order was improper. The Baird court drew the same dis-
tinction as it had with French: the order in Olson compelled the
defendant to cooperate under sanction of losing the right to assert
the insanity defense; the Baird case did not.
No federal case has ever held that a court can deny a defendant
the right to assert an insanity defense as a sanction for his failure
to cooperate. Indeed, since insanity indicates a lack of mens rea,
this defense would appear to be a right. To deny a defendant the
opportunity of presenting evidence on this issue would seem to
violate due process.48
Any question raised by the Wade decision concerning the proper
wording of an order compelling the defendant's cooperation was
cleared up by the decision in United States v. Handy.40  The or-
der in that case read: "If defendant does not comply with this
order he shall be precluded at trial from presenting testimony
upon the issue of his alleged mental capacity by any expert by
whom he has been interviewed."50  The Ninth Circuit, noting
that this order was "materially different" from that involved in
Wade, had no difficulty in upholding it. This order should serve
as a model for courts which desire to include a sanction as an
inducement to a defendant's cooperation with the prosecution ex-
pert.
46. See Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination?
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 RUTamis L. Rns. 489 (1965); Com-
ment, Compulsory Mental Examinations and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 1964 WiscoNsin L. Rlv. 671 (1964).
47. 274 Minn. 225, 143 N.W.2d 69 (1966).
48. See Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination?
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 RunaEns L. R-v. 489 (1965).
49. 450 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971).
50. Id. at 148.
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SELF-INCRIVINATION
The most difficult and perplexing issue generated by judicial
edicts which compel a defendant to submit to an examination by
a prosecution psychiatrist centers squarely on the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. While no federal appel-
late court has accepted the argument that a defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination is violated when he is compelled by the
court to cooperate with a prosecution psychiatrist, the courts have
had to labor long and hard to rationalize their decisions. Their
efforts indicate that the conflict between the principles involved
may be insoluable, at least from a theoretical viewpoint.
It is basic hornbook law that criminal responsibility depends
primarily upon the concurrence of mens rea and actus reus-the
intent to do an act with knowledge of the circumstances that
make that act a criminal offense, coupled with a course of conduct
which violates the law.51 "It is an established principle that every
true crime (as distinguished from 'regulatory' or 'public welfare'
offenses) ordinarily requires a general criminal intent or 'mens
rea.'"52 And there must be some accompanying act or conduct in
violation of law.53 As such, it is incumbent upon the prosecution
to prove that the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea in
any of its varied forms, and it must do so beyond a reasonable
doubt.
But the fifth amendment states that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ....
When a court orders a defendant to submit to an examination
conducted by a prosecution expert, and to answer each and every
question posed to him so that the expert can formulate an opinion
as to the defendant's capacity to form the requisite degree of mens
rea, does this not compel the defendant to furnish evidence to the
prosecution on a necessary element of the offense with which he
is charged? Regardless of whether or not the defendant's state-
ments to the psychiatrist are repeated at trial, isn't the defendant
being compelled to be a witness against himself by forcing him to
supply the prosecution expert with the information he needs to
51. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES or CRImINAL LA.W 22, 70-71, 104 (2d
ed. 1960).
52. 1 B. WrnK=n, CALIFORNIA CRIMES 56 (1963).
53. Id. at 70.
formulate his opinions? From a theoretical point of view, the
answers to both questions would appear to be "yes." But from a
judicial point of view the answers have always been "no."
In addition to the case law on point, other authorities have con-
cluded that the fifth amendment provides no obstacle to this
procedure. The Model Penal Code contains a provision roughly
parallel to section 4244, except that it includes the power to have
the defendant examined as to his competence at the time of the
offense.54 The psychiatrist who conducts the examination may
be called as a witness at the trial by either the prosecution, the
defense, or the court. He can testify as to the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the offense, including the extent to which
the capacity of the defendant was impaired as a result of a mental
disease or defect at that time. He may also make any explana-
tion necessary to clarify his diagnosis and opinion. 55
The Model Code of Evidence provides that no one has a privilege
to refuse "to submit his body to examination for the purpose of
discovering or recording ... his physical or mental condi-
tion .... 5
Several different theories have been advanced in rejecting the
fifth amendment claim. Some decisions have spoken in terms of
what has been described as "necessity;" others have applied the
concepts of "waiver;" and one court has used the principles of
"estoppel." In spite of the various labels, however, all of the
theories have one thought in common: since the prosecution has
the duty of proving each and every element of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt, it would be unfair to allow a defendant to
assert an insanity defense and at the same time preclude the pros-
ecution from gathering evidence concerning the defendant's com-
petence from the best source available-the defendant himself.
The principle has long been recognized that the law presumes
that everyone charged with a crime is sane.57 It is also true that
once the defendant has raised the issue of his sanity, the burden
is on the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 8
Therefore, as the theory goes, the prosecution must have access
to the defendant's mind in order to shoulder this burden.
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (Final Draft, 1962).
55. Id. at § 4.07(3), (4).
56. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 205 (1942). The Uniform Rules of
Evidence contain a similar provision. UmFomR RULES oF EVIDENCE rule
25 (1953). See also PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. DIsTRXCT
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 504(d) (Revised Draft, 1971).
57. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486 (1895).
58. Id. at 485-92; Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1971).
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As a practical matter it is extremely difficult for the prosecution
to meet this burden without the benefit of the testimony of a
psychiatrist, especially where the defendant has presented expert
testimony based upon personal interviews. This difficulty is best
illustrated in the context of a battle between experts presented
by the defense and lay witnesses presented by the prosecution.
The rule has evolved that properly qualified lay witnesses, mean-
ing those who have had a prolonged and frequent opportunity
to observe the defendant and who can base their testimony on
specific instances of behavior or conduct, may testify as to the san-
ity of the defendant, and their testimony may be sufficient to
overcome expert testimony to the contrary. 9 Rarely, however,
have the courts been willing to find that the lay testimony was
sufficient to overcome the testimony of defense experts.6 0 This is
increasingly true as the medical sciences advance and knowledge
of matters of the mind-as expressed through psychiatrists and
psychologists-gains added acceptance in our society.
Furthermore, lay testimony buttressed by that of an expert
who testifies in the form of an answer to a hypothetical question
concerning the mental state of the defendant is still generally in-
sufficient to overcome the testimony of a defense expert who has
examined the defendant."1
On the other hand, the nature and quantum of the evidence
produced by the prosecution varies with the nature and quantum
of evidence produced by the defendant. 62 Thus, if the defense does
not produce a qualified expert on the sanity issue the prosecution
will have an easier task in shouldering its burden.6 3 Or, if the
59. McKenzie v. United States, 266 F.2d 524, 526-27 (10th Cir. 1959).
See also Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1971); Pope v.
United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968); Kaufman v. United States, 350 F.2d 408, 414
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 951 (1966); Buatte v. United States,
330 F.2d 342, 346 (9th Cir. 1964). But see United States v. Handy, 450
F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1971).
60. Buatte v. United States, 330 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1964); Argent v.
United States, 325 F.2d 162, 172 (5th Cir. 1963).
61. United States v. Westerhausen, 283 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1960).
62. Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also
United States v. Julian, 440 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ing-
man, 426 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1970); Kaufman v. United States, 350 F.2d 408
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 951 (1966).
63. Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743, 754 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 998 (1962).
prosecution can show that the opinion of a qualified expert is not
reliable because it is based upon deliberate false statements and
claims and the withholding of information by the accused, the
fact-finder would be warranted in discounting the medical reports
and testimony. 64 The prosecution can always hope that it will suc-
ceed in discrediting the defense experts in this manner, but medi-
cal experts have demonstrated an uncanny resistance to such at-
tacks. There is, therefore, a very real need on the part of the
prosecution for an expert witness who has examined the defendant
where the defendant has been examined by his own expert wit-
ness.
In the Pope case, as discussed above, 5 the court spoke of the
criminal trial as a search for the truth and, noting that the pros-
ecution has the burden of proof on the competency issue, stated
that it would be a "strange situation" if the prosecution was to
be denied the opportunity of examining the defendant in its at-
tempt to meet that burden.66 The court recognized, however, that
although expert medical opinion was not always essential to prove
competency, "it is certainly advisable and to be encouraged as an
important factor in the ascertainment of the truth."07  The only
authority cited in support of that position was a state decision,
State v. Whitlow,68 which held that the defendant should not be
able to advance an insanity defense "and then make the rules for
determination of the claim" by invoking the fifth amendment
privilege. On this slender thread the Eighth Circuit hung its
decision, specifically holding
that by raising the issue of insanity, by submitting to psychiatric
and psychological examination by his own examiners, and by
presenting evidence as to mental incompetency from the lips of
the defendant and those examiners, the defense raised that issue
for all purposes and that the government was appropriately
granted leave to have the defendant examined by experts of its
choice and to present their opinions in evidence.6 9
This thread is not as slender now as it once was, however.
The Pope decision was followed shortly thereafter by Alexander
v. United States,7 ° which stated that "[i]t would violate judicial
common sense to permit a defendant to invoke the defense of
64. United States v. Brewton, 434 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Ingman, 426 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1970), and cases from other cir-
cuits cited therein at 977.
65. See quotation in the text at note 24 supra.
66. 372 F.2d at 720.
67. Id.
68. 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
69. 372 F.2d at 721.
70. 380 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
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insanity and foreclose the Government from the benefit of a mental
examination to meet this issue. ' 71
Then came the Albright decision from the Fourth Circuit, which
rejected a fifth amendment attack by citing Pope and Winn v.
United States72 for the proposition that "a defendant's right not
to incriminate himself is not violated per se by requiring him, in
an appropriate case, to submit to a mental examination. '73
Perhaps detecting the frailty of the Pope doctrine, however, the
Albright court attempted to buttress its position. Whether or not
they succeeded is another question. The court first rationalized
that the purpose of the examination is not to obtain knowledge
about facts relating to the defendant's participation in the criminal
acts, but rather to obtain facts concerning a defendant "which are
themselves material to the case."' 74 The purpose is to prove not
whether he is guilty but whether he possesses the requisite mental
capacity to be guilty.
If there is a distinction there it should not be of any legal
significance. If the court was attempting to distinguish between
evidence relating to actus reus and that relating to mens tea,
the distinction fails. An act cannot be punished criminally unless
done with wrongful intent. Since the prosecution must prove
both actus reus and mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, it is
illogical to conclude that the fifth amendment protects a defendant
only as to the former, but that he can be compelled to provide
evidence against himself as to the latter.
The court next undertook an examination of the underlying pur-
poses of the fifth amendment privilege as set forth in Miranda v.
Arizona,75 concluding that those purposes were served by requiring
71. Id. at 39. The court cited Battle v. Cameron, 260 F. Supp. 804, 806
(D. D.C. 1966), which stated that it was an absurdity and a travesty ofjustice to deprive the prosecution of an examination of the accused.
72. 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The court's characterization of the
"implicit" ruling in Winn is open to question. The defendant was ap-
parently complaining about the refusal by the district court to allow an
examination as to his incompetence at the time of the offense. Although
the prosecution had made the motion for the examination, the defendant
also wanted such an exam in order to establish his insanity defense.
The circuit court ruled that the failure to grant this exam was reversible
error.
73. 388 F.2d at 723.
74. I&
75. 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
the examination. Set forth in a footnote was the following quote
from Miranda:
All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitu-
tional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a gov-
ernment ...must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citi-
zens. To maintain a 'fair state-individual balance,' to require
the government 'to shoulder the entire load, [citation] to respect
the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system
of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish
an individual produce the evidence against him by its own inde-
pendent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling it from his own mouth. [citation] In sum, the privi-
lege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right 'to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exer-
cise of his own will.' [citation]76
But whereas the Miranda court had used the catch phrases
"fair state-individual balance" and "requir[ing] the government
'to shoulder the entire load'" as factors militating in favor of a
defendant's fifth amendment privilege, conversely the Albright
decision used those phrases to debilitate the effectiveness of the
privilege. The court said that the examination was "clearly re-
quired," that the prosecution "cannot be denied access to the only
reliable means of ascertaining the truth," especially since the only
substitutes for such an examination-cross-examination of the de-
fense experts, lay testimony, and testimony of prosecution experts
based upon courtroom observations and hypothetical questions-
were poor and unsatisfactory.7 7
The next court to discuss the problem was the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Thornton v. Corcoran38 The defendant had re-
quested a pre-indictment examination under a code provision"
not applicable outside the District of Columbia. The trial court
ordered that he be examined both as to competency to stand trial
and at the time of the offense. The case arrived at the circuit level
upon the defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel
the district court to permit the defense counsel to attend the exam-
ination, an issue which will be discussed in detail later in this
article. While the precise issue before the court was the propriety
of mandamus relief, the court looked to the merits of the fifth
and sixth amendment claims to decide the procedural question.
Noting that both United States v. Wade (line-up) 8 0 and Schnmer-
ber v. California (blood test)8 had resolved the fifth amendment
76. 388 F.2d at 724, n.7.
77. Id. at 724-25.
78. 407 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
79. D.C. CoDE § 24-301(a) (1967).
80. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
81. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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claims on the ground that no evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature was involved, the court stated that that dis-
tinction was irrelevant in the context of a mental examination
where the words of the defendant are "critically important" in
determining competency.8 2  The court stated that the "few cases
that have considered this issue have rejected the claim, but their
reasoning has been less than satisfying."'83 The court character-
ized the theory set forth in Albright, Alexander, and Pope as one
of "necessity," which, "however compelling, no longer justifies in-
terrogation of the defendant without regard for the Fifth Amend-
ment concerning his participation in the acts charged, where the
Government ... must also 'shoulder the entire load.' "384
There may be sound reasons to distinguish between criminal acts
and the accompanying mental state of the actor in measuring the
scope of the self-incrimination privilege. But since the Govern-
ment must prove a "vicious act" and a "vicious will," we cannot
simply assume a distinction between the two insofar as the
privilege against self-incrimination is concerned.8 5
The only theory which the court was willing to accept was an
extremely limited one: the defendant waives the privilege when
he requests the Government to provide a mental examination. 6
That theory fit the facts of the case then before the court. But
the court did not deal with the situation presented when the de-
fendant does not himself request an examination. In any case,
the court's ultimate decision was that these issues should not be
resolved in the context of a petition for writ of mandamus, and
the district court decision was upheld. But the Thornton decision
did set forth an articulate and well-reasoned criticism of the
prior federal decisions, and gave new life to fifth amendment at-
tacks.
The Second Circuit was the next court to consider the problem
82. 407 F.2d at 700.
83. Id.
84. Id. The "no longer. .. " language was an allusion to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda decision was, of course, avail-
able to the Aibright, Alexander, and Pope courts, however, so this state-
ment is somewhat misleading.
85. 407 F.2d at 700.
86. This theory was suggested by the circuit judicial conference. See
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT or COLUMBIA, REPORT OF THE Comm.
ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL ExAmINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN
CRIMINAL CASES, BEFORE TRIAL, at 55-56, 107-118 (1966).
in the case of United States v. Baird.8 7 In its order compelling
the defendant to submit to a prosecution examination the district
court had stated that "there is no privilege . . . to decline to
answer any question put to him by this examining psychiatrist."88
On appeal, the prosecution argued that the defendant had made
a pro tanto waiver of the fifth amendment privilege by offering
expert testimony on the competency issue, citing Pope, Alexander,
and Albright. The court agreed that those cases generally sup-
ported the government's position, but, like the Thornton case,
the Second Circuit did not like the reasoning and rejected the
pro tanto waiver theory:
Instead, we conclude that the defendant's election to place in evi-
dence expert opinion testimony, based upon defendant's own state-
ments to the alienist whose qualification to testify rested upon
those statements, which were made subsequent to the commission
of one of the criminal acts charged, estopped the defendant from
objecting to a like examination of the accused by the Govern-
ment's expert and the admission into evidence of his opinion tes-
timony.8 9
The court did not explain why it found the waiver theory un-
acceptable, but it did explain at great length the reasoning behind
the estoppel theory. The court approached the problem by dis-
cussing the testimony which had been introduced at the trial. The
district court had denied a pretrial prosecution motion for an ex-
amination because the defendant had not indicated that an insan-
ity defense would be raised. After the conclusion of the prosecu-
tion case-in-chief the defense called two psychiatrists, both of
whom had examined the defendant. They both testified that the
defendant lacked capacity to commit the crime. Moreover, both
were permitted to repeat numerous out-of-court self-serving hear-
say statements made by the defendant during the examinations, as
well as statements made by the defendant's brother to the psy-
chiatrists. The jury was instructed that those statements were
not admitted for the truth of what was said but only as a de-
scription of the material upon which the experts based their opin-
ions. The prosecution then renewed its motion for an examina-
tion, which was granted. But the trial court indicated that it
would limit the prosecution expert's testimony to the issue of
criminal responsibility and would not permit the repetition of
anything the defendant said which bore on the issue of guilt or
innocence. The trial court attempted to draw a line between
statements related to wilfulness, which would not be admitted,
87. 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969).
88. Id. at 705.
89. Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
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and those related to criminal responsibility, which would be ad-
mitted. The prosecution expert subsequently testified that the
defendant was not incompetent, and related certain statements
made by the defendant as the basis for his opinion.
On appeal, the defendant objected to the introduction of any
statements he made to the prosecution expert during the examina-
tion. The defendant first argued that the defense experts could
repeat everything that the defendant told them, including matter
designed to be completely exculpatory on the issue of guilt. In
rejecting that argument, the circuit court noted that no decision
exempts defense witnesses from the operation of the hearsay rule.
The defendant next argued that his experts' repetition of what
he had told them during the examinations was admissible as ver-
bal acts upon which their opinions had been based, and therefore,
came within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. At the
same time, however, he argued that this same theory was un-
available to the prosecution by operation of the fifth amendment,
even though the prosecution did not introduce those statements
for the truth of the contents and even though they did not intro-
duce anything said by the accused on the issue of guilt or inno-
cence.
The circuit court was not attracted by this theory. After first
observing that the theory of limited admissibility "makes the as-
sumption, as a convenient legal fiction, that the jury is able to
ignore the fact that the expert's report of what the accused said
and what [his brother] said actually put before the jurors the
accused's own story in defense without his taking the witness
stand,"90 the court concluded that the defendant's right against
self-incrimination was not infringed. The court, relying on State
v. Whitlow,"1 took judicial notice of the fact that a psychiatric
interview is the basic diagnostic tool in a psychiatric examination,
and approved the verbal acts doctrine as a basis for admitting into
evidence the conversations and statements of the defendant
through the mouth of a defense expert. These statements were
equated with x-rays and blood tests which often serve as the
basis for a medical diagnosis. As such the court stated that they
90. Id. at 704 (footnotes omitted).
91. 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
could be considered as "real or physical evidence" rather than as
"communications" or "testimony" within the meaning of Schmerber
v. California.92 That case held that the fifth amendment did not
bar the compulsion which makes a defendant the source of "real
or physical evidence." Noting that the defendant had taken full
advantage of the theory of admissibility which treated his hearsay
statements as real evidence, the court said that this was tanta-
mount to asking the court to hold that there was no communicative
aspect to his evidence. If those statements had no communicative
aspect, then the same characterization applied to the statements
made to the prosecution psychiatrist. Rather than a waiver by
the defendant,
[i]t is more accurate to say that a defendant who raises a defense
based on criminal responsibility is estopped from making an ef-
fective objection to the Government's proceeding in this fashion
when he, himself, has relied upon the same evidence-admissi-
bility theory .... 93
This estoppel theory would appear to be sound, at least as it
applies to statements made during an examination which are re-
peated by the examiners at trial. If the defendant chooses to intro-
duce his statements made to his experts, he must rely on the verbal
acts exception to the hearsay rule which treats such statements
merely as foundational material for the expert opinions. It is
logical to characterize these verbal acts as real or physical evidence
within the meaning of Schmerber. If they are properly character-
ized as real or physical evidence, then the fifth amendment is
not applicable. Since the defendant has relied upon these evi-
dentiary rules in putting on his witnesses, and since the fifth
amendment is not a bar, the defendant is estopped to object to like
conduct by the prosecution and its witnesses.
Of course, other courts might not wish to make the jump from
"verbal acts" to "real or physical evidence," thereby destroying
the logic of the position. The District of Columbia Circuit had
refused to make that jump in the Thornton case.94 Indeed, a good
case can be made for the proposition that a statement is a com-
munication rather than real or physical evidence. If there is a
weak link in the estoppel theory, this is where it lies.
The Second Circuit was also somewhat vague in explaining how
the estoppel theory applies as to the examination itself. What
would the situation be if the defense experts did not repeat any
of the defendant's statements in explaining the bases for their opin-
92. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
93. 414 F.2d at 709.
94. See text at note 82 supra.
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ions? The expert's opinion itself is not hearsay, and therefore
is not dependent upon the verbal acts doctrine for its admissibility.
Of course this problem was not before the court in Baird, and no
answer can be expected there. The decision did in fact hold that
the defendant was estopped to object to the exam, but the reason-
ing must await another day.
After concluding that no recognizable self-incrimination prob-
lem was presented, the court indicated that exceptional circum-
stances could exist which might call for further safeguards and
limitations. If the defense is aware of information which would
cause grave damage to the defendant if disclosed to the prosecution
through its expert, defense counsel should seek a protective order
from the court in advance of the exam.
As a final note it should be pointed out that the circuit court
intimated that the district court had been overly cautious in
refusing to admit statements which had a direct bearing on the
defendant's guilt. Following its own logic, the court stated that
if the statements were to be treated as verbal acts rather than
communications, then any and all statements made by the de-
fendant would be admissible regardless of the subject matter of
the statement. That certainly is consistent with the court's con-
cept, but it is suggested that trial judges should exercise their
discretion to keep out any statements which are too directly re-
lated to the issue of guilt; it must be remembered that all of the
statements are admitted over a limiting instruction, and experience
teaches, and the law recognizes, that such limiting instructions
may be ineffective to prevent unwarranted prejudice to the de-
fendant.05
In United States v. Bohle,9 6 the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rejected a fifth amendment attack on the prosecution exam-
ination which the trial court had ordered. Noting the lack of
unanimity on the issue, which is still a "developing concept in the
law,'' 97 the court approved the reasoning and result of the Al-
bright case. Any risk to the fifth amendment privilege is minimal.
There is no violation of the privilege because the sole purpose
of the exam is to enable the expert to form an opinion as to the
95. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1968).
96. 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971).
97. Id. at 66.
defendant's mental capacity to form criminal intent. It is not in-
tended to establish facts showing that the defendant committed
certain acts constituting a crime. The court concluded that the
rights of the defendant are fully protected by an exclusionary rule
which prohibits the use of any statements made during the exam
on the issue of guilt.
This approach is totally incompatible with that set forth in
Baird, disregards the criticisms of the Pope-Alexander-Albright
trilogy set forth in Thornton, and is insensitive to the importance
of the mens rea element as indicated by the almost total emphasis
placed on the actus reus element.
The latest circuit to speak to the issue was the Ninth in United
States v. Handy.98 It took the court less than one page to reject
the fifth amendment claim here, perhaps indicating that the law
has developed about as much as it is going to. With a minimum
of effort, the court said that it would "indeed be anomalous" if
the defendant could raise the issue of his sanity and then preclude
the prosecution from offering testimony to the contrary.9 With-
out the estoppel theory the court concluded that the statements
the defendant had to make during the examination to an expert
who subsequently testified for the prosecution were not communi-
cations or testimony, but rather, were the same as blood tests,
handwriting exemplars, fingerprints, photographs, measurements,
voice identifications, and similar activities, all of which are ad-
missible under the Schmerber doctrine. Since there was no com-
pelled communication or testimony, there was no fifth amendment
problem.
Perhaps the Handy case and its approach, following essentially
the main points of the Baird decision, is the wave of the future.
It is unlikely that any of the five circuits which have dealt with
the issue directly-the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth-will alter their approaches in the near future. All of these
decisions have been rendered since 1967. Only the District of
Columbia Circuit has indicated a dissatisfaction with all of the
theories which had been advanced up to the time of the Thornton
decision. Quite probably that circuit will speak to the issue again,
perhaps by formulating a new approach, or perhaps by following
the two state decisions which have ruled that the fifth amendment
is a bar to prosecution examinations. Or perhaps one of the re-
maining five circuits will devise a theory which is more consistent
with general principles of criminal law.
98. 450 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971).
99. Id. at 148-49.
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It is bothersome that none of the cases have satisfactorily re-
solved the issue. Prior to any express holding on the fifth amend-
ment issue by any federal appellate court, two state supreme
courts had ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination pre-
cluded a court from compelling a defendant to undergo a prosecu-
tion examination. Those decisions were theoretically and consti-
tutionally sound, but they led to an undesirable result. The
federal courts have chosen not to follow those decisions, but have
reached opposite conclusions based on far less consistent reasoning.
The "waiver" theory holds little hope for the future. Other
cases dealing with the alleged waiver of various constitutional
rights have stringently upheld the principle that the waiver must
be voluntarily made with knowledge and understanding of the
consequences thereof. It is difficult to see how one can be said
to waive his fifth amendment privilege by pleading not guilty by
reason of insanity.
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the prosecution
genuinely needs the testimony of its own expert witness in order
to rebut that offered by defense experts on the issue of criminal
responsibility. The prosecution has the burden of proof as to mens
rea, and like all other elements of the offense, it must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is unrealistic to expect the prose-
cution to carry this burden without the benefit of an examination
of the defendant. But the question is-is "necessity" enough to
put aside constitutional principles, or is the fifth amendment priv-
ilege an absolute one? In many areas of criminal law the courts
historically have restricted police and prosecution conduct which
conflicted with constitutional principles, in spite of the fact that
a need for certain evidence was demonstrated. 00 In other cases
the courts have refused to apply constitutional protections in ab-
solute terms.101
The basic test has always been one of reason. Is it reasonable
under all the circumstances to permit a certain course of conduct?
100. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
101. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Nelson v. O'Neil,
402 U.S. 622 (1971); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
This involves a very complex balancing of all of the circumstances
involved, with an eye to less offensive alternatives. This bal-
ancing act has led in the past to decisions' 0 2 which, on their face,
have refused to apply constitutional safeguards in absolute terms.
The reasoning of those cases is no more irrational than the reason-
ing offered to reject the fifth amendment claims as it applies to
psychiatric examinations. This result can best be explained by
recognizing that, in rejecting the fifth amendment challenge, the
federal courts have made a decision based upon public policy
considerations having more to do with the practical administration
of the system of criminal justice than with constitutional prin-
ciples. The courts have decided that this is one area where the
literal meaning of the fifth amendment must be subordinated to
the more realistic and pragmatic problems which would otherwise
result.
SIXTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Another issue of constitutional dimensions which has arisen in
the recent insanity cases concerns the sixth amendment right to
counsel at the psychiatric examination conducted by the prosecu-
tion. While the treatment accorded this issue has not been as
extensive as that given to the fifth amendment claims, the courts
have shown more tolerance for the defense position than in the
fifth amendment cases. To be sure, no federal appellate decision
has yet concluded that the sixth amendment is violated if the
defendant is not allowed to have his attorney present during the
prosecution examination. But some of the decisions do indicate
that, in an appropriate case, the presence of counsel may be con-
stitutionally required. This suggestion receives some support from
the Model Penal Code, which states that the court "may direct
that a qualified psychiatrist retained by the defendant be per-
mitted to witness and participate in the examination."'10 3 Very few
cases have relied upon this authority, however.
Essentially the cases dealing with the sixth amendment issue in
this context involve attempts by the defense to further extend
the right to counsel by convincing the courts that the prosecution
examination is a critical stage in the proceedings. Primary reliance
is placed on United States v. Wade, 04 which held that the accused
has a right to have his counsel present at a critical state of the
proceedings against him. Along with the argument that defense
counsel should be allowed to attend the examination, it is argued
102. Id.
103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (1) (Final Draft, 1962).
104. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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alternatively that a defense expert be allowed to attend, or that
a recording or transcription of the examination should be made.
All of these arguments will be discussed together within the sixth
amendment framework.
The same cases which raised fifth amendment issues also raised
sixth amendment issues, so the case names should be familiar by
now. To a certain extent the sixth amendment problem cannot
be resolved without some inquiry into the area of self-incrimina-
tion. Thus, in the Albright case, the court concluded that the
"need for the presence of an attorney is obviated" 10 5 if the privilege
against self-incrimination is protected. The court was concerned
that the presence of a third party at the psychiatric interview
would be a disruptive influence in light of the intimate and per-
sonal nature of that examination. Albright relied upon State v.
Whitlow,100 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that
it was within the discretion of the trial judge to decide whether
defense counsel should be present. Whitlow, decided in 1965,
pre-dated the Wade decision, but that factor did not dissuade the
Albright court from adopting it as the rule in the Fourth Circuit.
The Thornton decision, as indicated above, dealt with a statu-
tory procedure unique to the District of Columbia. For that reason
its analysis of the sixth amendment problem is difficult to apply
in the setting which usually confronts other circuit and district
courts. Essentially, this procedure calls for a normal psychiatric
examination and interview, for the dual purpose of determining
both competency to stand trial and at the time of the offense. It
is conducted by one member of the hospital staff, and is followed
by a staff conference attended by the examiner and various other
members of the hospital staff, during portions of which the de-
fendant is not present. This conference is preparatory to the sub-
mission of the psychiatric report to the court. At the time that
the trial judge ordered Thornton's examination, the defendant
requested that the court allow his counsel and his expert to attend
the staff conference. This request was denied.
On appeal, the defendant relied upon the Wade decision. That
case had excluded blood tests and fingerprints from the class of
105. 388 F.2d at 726.
106. 45 N J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
pretrial confrontations which require the presence of counsel be-
cause the knowledge of the technology and techniques involved
therein is sufficiently available to allow a defendant "the oppor-
tunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case
at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the
Government's expert witnesses and the presentation of the evi-
dence of his own experts."'' 07
The court stated that the application of the Wade doctrine to
the issue to be decided was "anything but clear."'01 8 The court
was not convinced that all of the relevant factors which exempt
scientific tests from the operation of the sixth amendment were
satisfied in the context of a mental examination. Unlike finger-
prints and blood samples, there is a lack of agreement among
experts concerning the theory and techniques of diagnosing men-
tal illness. The personnel conducting the examination may lack
impartiality, since they may ultimately testify for the prosecution
at trial. The possible fifth amendment problems militate in favor
of the right to counsel. The ability of defense counsel to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses might be hampered if he or a de-
fense expert are not allowed to observe. This latter observation
was premised on the fact that appointed attorneys are unskilled in
the legal-medical problems of insanity, and have a difficult time
acquiring the necessary information to educate themselves about
their clients. In short, it is difficult to prepare a proper defense
without the cooperation of the hospital staff. All of these factors
led the court to conclude that the defendant's reliance on Wade
was "anything but frivolous."10 9
Moreover, in light of the fact that the staff conference involved
a multitude of people, the court could not accept the argument
put forth in Albright that the presence of a third party would
constitute a fatally disruptive influence.
As noted above,' 10 the court ultimately decided that these crucial
issues should not be decided in the context of a petition for a
writ of mandamus. The court did note, however, that even if the
defendant's right to cross-examine the witnesses against him was
not adequately protected by the procedures then in force, the
presence of counsel might not be the appropriate remedial step.
The court suggested that alternative methods, such as recording
the examination, might be better suited to protecting the defend-
ant's rights.
107. 388 U.S. at 227-28.
108. 407 F.2d at 699.
109. Id. at 702.
110. See text at note 79 supra.
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Similarly, in the Driscoll case, which dealt primarily with the
prejudicial effect of "dual purpose" orders under section 4244,111
the circuit court suggested that the defendant might have asked
for and received certain procedural safeguards had he known of
the scope of the examination. Although the court chose not to
pass upon that possibility, it suggested that the alternative safe-
guards available included the presence of counsel at the exam or
the transcribing or video-tape recording of the proceedings. 112
Approximately one year later, however, the Second Circuit de-
cided not to follow the dicta of the Driscoll case. In the Baird
case, the defendant had requested that his counsel be present at
the examination or that the interview be transcribed by a sten-
ographer. These requests were denied. On appeal, the defendant
urged that the examination was a "critical stage" in the proceed-
ings under the sixth amendment by analogy to Wade.
In ruling that the examination is not the kind of critical stage
at which the assistance of counsel was needed the court cited the
following considerations:
[T]he purpose of the examination was to qualify the Govern-
ment's expert and furnish him with a basis for an opinion... to
which the expert could testify at trial; ... statements made to
him by the accused could not be used on the issue of guilt or
innocence of conunitting the offenses and were to be treated only
as verbal acts from which the expert's opinion was drawn; ...
the accused had no privilege to refuse to answer the alienist's
questions .... 113
Of major significance to the court was the defendant's inability
to show how his counsel could have been of assistance to him at
the examination or how he was otherwise prejudiced by the ab-
sence of his counsel. Noting that the Wade decision had been
based in part on a possible impairment of the right of confronta-
tion, the court was convinced that the right to cross-examine the
prosecution expert had been protected. The defendant was made
aware of the purpose and scope of the interview. Defense counsel
was experienced in the presentation of psychiatric testimony, and
was given access to the notes of the prosecution expert. Counsel
was given ample opportunity to prepare for his cross-examination.
111. See text at notes 19-22 supra.
112. 399 F.2d at 138, n.2.
113. 414 F.2d at 711.
There was no showing that the prosecution expert distorted or
misrepresented what occurred at the interview. In short, the court
was "not persuaded that the procedure itself harbors substantial
dangers; and without a more adequate and less speculative showing
of actual prejudice, we are not tempted to forge new constitutional
rules."'114 Additionally, the court adopted the theory first set
forth in Whitlow that the presence of a third party at the exami-
nation would tend to destroy the effectiveness of the interview.
The Baird decision, just as it had with the fifth amendment
issue, persuasively disposed of the sixth amendment attack. While
the Thornton decision offers some incentive and support for im-
aginative defense counsel, the Baird decision presents a substantial
obstacle. Of course, since the latter decision spelled out specifi-
cally why the Wade analogy is inappropriate, it likewise indicates
what burdens must be overcome and what showings will be re-
quired for future protagonists if they intend to show that the ex-
amination is a critical stage in the proceedings. In that regard,
then, the case is a valuable guide for prosecutors, defense counsel,
and judges.
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have also refused to find
that the sixth amendment requires the presence of counsel at a
prosecution examination. The former considered the issue briefly
in the Bohle case, which treated the absence of a defense expert
in the same manner as the absence of counsel. The court relied
upon the Whitlow-Albright rule which left the matter to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.115 The Ninth Circuit rejected a sixth
amendment claim in Handy without discussion. The court ap-
parently felt that its reasons for rejecting a fifth amendment claim
were adequate to foreclose the sixth amendment issue as well." 0
The related argument has been made that the defendant is at
least entitled to a transcript or audio or video recording of the
prosecution examination. Aside from the dicta found in Thornton
and Driscoll, this theory has not been accepted. In the Pope
case, the trial court had denied a defense motion for a transcript
or recording of the examination. Although the appellate court
did not precisely frame the issue in terms of the sixth amendment
it nevertheless concluded that there was no requirement that a
recording be made and provided to the defendant." 7
With the exception of the Thornton case all of the decisions
114. Id. at 711.
115. 445 F.2d at 67.
116. 450 F.2d at 148-49.
117. 372 F.2d at 721.
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speaking to the sixth amendment issue are consistent. The Whit-
low-Albright rule, which has been followed by the Bohle and
Handy"18 cases, rejected the sixth amendment attack, but provided
some flexibility by leaving it to the discretion of the trial judge
to determine if and when to allow defense counsel to attend the
examination. The Baird decision, although not specifically relying
on the Whitlow-Albright rule, likewise rejected the sixth amend-
ment argument. The cases have consistently refused to extend
the Wade line-up case into the area of pretrial prosecution psy-
chiatric examinations.
On the other hand, the great concern evidenced by these de-
cisions, including Thornton, for the defendant's right to effectively
confront and cross-examine the prosecution expert indicates that
the Whitlow-Albright rule should be liberally applied. The trial
judge should not hesitate to exercise his discretion to insure that
defense counsel is provided with a reasonable opportunity to pre-
pare his cross-examination. The Baird decision had partially based
its rejection of the sixth amendment claim upon the fact that the
defense counsel representing the defendant was experienced in
presenting psychiatric evidence, had been given access to the prose-
cution expert's notes, and had ample opportunity to prepare his
cross-examination. But as the Thornton case indicated, quite often
the defense counsel is appointed and may not be experienced in
this complex area. Busy court calendars might not allow defense
counsel as much time as is necessary to prepare for cross-exami-
nation, especially in those cases where the trial is recessed in mid-
stream to allow for the prosecution examination. These factors
illustrate that prosecutors and judges must be willing to devise
procedures to ensure adequate cross-examination. Procedures
short of the actual presence of the defendant's counsel or his
expert, such as recordings or transcriptions of the interview or
permitting defense counsel to listen to the interview from an ad-
joining room, may be sufficient to protect the defendant's rights.
Moreover, as long as the effectiveness of the psychiatric interview
is not disturbed, neither the prosecution nor the courts have a
legitimate reason for denying defense counsel access to this pro-
ceeding. There are no countervailing policy considerations, such
118. Though there was no discussion on the issue, the court cited Al-
bright and Bohle in making its combined ruling.
as in the fifth amendment area, which restrict the defendant's
rights under the sixth amendment.
CONCLUSION
The problems presented by the insanity defense are of such
complexity that some commentators, unable to resolve the con-
ceptual difficulties, have suggested that the insanity defense in
its present form be abolished.119 Some states have attempted to
simplify the problems by providing for a bifurcated trial in which
the insanity issue insulated from the issue of guilt.120 As long
as the current procedures remain in effect, these problems, most
notably that presented by the fifth amendment, will also remain.
From a practical point of view, at least, the law appears to have
been settled on the points discussed herein. Nevertheless a sense
of uneasiness lingers behind, occasioned by the imperfect solutions
offered to reconcile the conflicting principles involved. The ulti-
mate result, however, would appear to be realistic. If the prosecu-
tion is to be precluded from examining the defendant, the potential
abuse would be manifest. If the defendant succeeded in convinc-
ing one psychiatric expert of his insanity, the prosecution would
be virtually powerless to prove otherwise. Perhaps the courts
have arrived at the only practical resolution available; to demand
perfection may be asking too much.
119. B. WooTroN, CamAE Am =ri CRnaNAL LAw (1963); H. HAIT, PUN-
ISHEMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
120. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1970).
